(This article is originally from August 2021)
The idea of a middle power and its underline underpinnings have not always been clearly stated in international politics. Today it is an idea or concept that still does not have a clearly defined definition and as this article will clearly point out through empirical evidence, each of the three countries that will be discussed to some degree may not be viewed as a middle power on a global scale but perhaps regionally and this argument clearly expresses the isolation of this term. Holbraad (1984: 10) observed that early political writings of this idea were rather ‘scattered’. Hence, a clear definition of this idea will suffice. According to Jordaan (2003: 165) middle powers can be defined as “states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system”.
The current liberal world order which has existed since 1945 led to the rise of superpower rivalry mainly between the Soviet Union and the United States (US), popularly termed ‘east versus west’. However, this morphed into unipolarity with the US taking centre stage as its ideals and norms gained traction in most parts with the world, with the collapse of communism in 1991 coinciding with the third wave of western style democracy that spread into many third world countries. The dominance of the US after the end of the Cold War, which precipitated with the fall of communism in terms of its ideological underpinnings, became the ‘modus operandi’ in the international political system in attaining peace and stability as supported by political commentator Fareed Zakaria in his book titled Ten Lesson For A Post-Pandemic World (2020).
In 2020 this system took a sudden jolt with the arrival of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), which was first detected in Wuhan China in December 2019 and later became a global health crisis (BBC 2020). The response to this pandemic was surprisingly state-centric with multilateralism seemingly ‘going out of the window’ in the early stages of the pandemic as each individual country put up its own strategies to unilaterally deal with the virus with only a more multilateral response in line with the World Health Organisation (WHO) only being taken into consideration at later stages. The coronavirus has led to a redress of the balance of power which has tilted too heavily to superpowers or great powers until now and although these superpowers and, or great powers still hold on to the status quo cracks are now starting to appear.
According to Paris (2019: 2) in his article, Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order? (2019) he argues that middle powers could succeed in slowing the erosion of the current order and could actually strengthen it. Hence the importance of middle powers protecting international norms, agreements, and institutions by strengthening multilateralism. To make this a reality middle powers must take advantage of their opportunities which include specialised diplomatic skills, and what Andrew Cooper and Mo Jongryn argue is their “appreciation of the salience of selective multilateralism in a pluralistic environment” (Schweller 2017: 8). To fully gain a greater perspective as to how middle powers can not only preserve the international system but to amend it for the better a case study analysis of several countries is necessary as it will give a pretext on how this concept can be beneficial in the post covid era and will be discussed in detail in this article.
Australia
The country’s presence in this article is fitting as Australia has projected some significant influence globally mainly from its key influence over the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in Oceania where Australia is by far and large the economic powerhouse and regional hegemon. This makes Australia a significant player both economically and diplomatically, and this is incredible considering the country’s small population in relation to other middle power centres. The Indo-Pacific concept is defined in a 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper as “ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States” (Davis 2020: 6).
The country has a record in the region for championing diplomatic efforts and this includes its involvement in Cambodia and East Timor. It has also been active in arms control and has taken a leadership role in limiting weapons of mass destruction by passing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996 (Thomson 2005: 2). Following the outbreak of COVID-19 the country managed to contain the spread of COVID-19 by implementing rapid responses to do so such as lockdowns and other measures which were ahead of global trends and the advice of the WHO (Nonnenmacher 2020). However as the delta variant spread across the world the country has of late seen a sharp increase in cases, particularly in the state of New South Wales. Although there has been a recent spike in cases and has threatened the country’s covid-zero plan, with the country recording almost 40000 cases of COVID-19 with almost 1000 deaths since the start of the pandemic according to WHO (2021) (as of 16 August 2021), this still pales in comparison to its western counterparts.
The pandemic has clearly displayed the risks of relying on a single major trading partner, particularly with western partners and Australia witnessed its own vulnerability to consolidated supply chains hence its need to solidify its multilateral networks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region which is home to the world’s largest GDP according to Yendamuri & Ingilizian (2019) which Australia should lean on to grow its diverse economy going forward. Although this may seem only beneficial to Australia at first glance, it indeed has global repercussions as Australia can leverage its economic potential to actually play an important role in stabilising the global economy in the post-covid era, as well as through multilateral organisations. Australia can also cement its presence as a friendly regional middle power according to Nonnenmachar (2020) rather than been seen as an aggressive power through its laid back and compassionate approach that many around the world have admired and these include regional blocs such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which exemplify the country’s commitment to regionalism. As part of the post-COVID recovery effort the country can continue to exude compassionate diplomacy by providing foreign aid and medical equipment to countries in need.
Australia can continue this trajectory through soft power which is vital to the country’s foreign policy as stated in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Chapter 8 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government 2017: 16). Soft power is defined as “the ability to shape preferences of others by attraction, rather than coercion” according to Nye (2004) and operates through foreign policies imbued with moral authority. This is exuded in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper which goes on to argue through an adoption of soft power that it is able to persuade and influence others and this includes its democracy, rule of law, environmental protection which gives the country credibility around the world and lastly its commitment to finding solutions to regional matters which underpins its status as a middle power (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government 2017: 110).
A middle power cannot stand on its own and is only influential to smaller powers, in the case of Australia over the Indo-Pacific, including small pacific island states due to its significant influence over the region, but to a certain extent be also influenced by great powers in certain areas and Australia found this influence with the United States which is a vital ally that its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (2017: 38-39) notes as a security and economic partner and also “continues to be essential to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific”. This is because the United States is seen as a pacifier in the region against major powers, specifically China (Schweller 2017, 7). However, despite the current tensions between China and Australia on a number of issues, including the origin of the coronavirus and alleged meddling in Australia’s domestic affairs by China, Australia considers China one of its most important partners according to its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (2017: 38) and acknowledges China’s growing regional and global presence but ‘politely’ encourages China to exercise restraint in the way it conducts its version of international relations that respects international law.
Australia is clearly a middle power due to its influence over the Indo-Pacific region, due to its strong economic performance which has remained strong during the pandemic while other developed nations saw their economies take a hit in the early stages of the pandemic with Karp (2021) arguing that the Australian economy is ‘roaring back’. This is largely placed at the feet of the Australian government for providing steady leadership that stabilised the economy, lowered COVID-19 cases and deaths while maintaining a strong presence in a number of multilateral forums which has reinforced its status as a middle power.
Canada
The country’s status as a middle power is without question and Jordaan (2003: 166) solidifies this standpoint by viewing Canada, not as an emerging middle power like South Africa, which will be discussed later in this article, but as a traditional middle power. A traditional middle power can be defined as one who ‘legitimises and stabilises’ the world order according to Jordaan (2003: 169) and Canada plays an important role here globally. Middle powers tend not to interfere on a widespread scale as great powers often resort to, and in conflict situations they prefer to focus on conflict reduction in a multilateral setting to find what Jordaan (2003: 167) calls a ‘workable compromise’. A recent example was the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the country called for a ceasefire along with many others which eventually happened, with the country’s Global Affairs Minister Marc Garneau welcoming the ceasefire (Global News 2021). This shows the country exercising its middle power influence as a force of good in finding peaceful solutions to end conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Canada’s rise to an active middle power has been a gradual journey that has its epoch in its current diplomatic form from the ravages of World War Two. The nation reinvented itself, not as a state desiring more territory, or a state desiring to become a superpower and involve itself in any global conflict in the name of protecting either capitalist or communist interests. No, that was not the approach Canada desired going forward. Yes, it is without question that Canada is an ardent supporter of capitalism, but it also projected itself as a Country that was willing to make diplomatic ties not just with the western world but also the non-western world. Examples include Cuba which the country continued to have even though many of its western counterparts broke off relations in 1959 following the Cuban revolution led by guerrilla leader Fidel Castro and likely continued relations with Cuba up to today in line with its foreign policy with the hope of using its middle power influence to encourage Cuba to modernise as it supports the current process of economic modernisation the Cuban government has been taking according to the Government of Canada (2018) with Canada’s approach being to engage all elements of Cuban society such as the government, non-governmental organisations and civil society.
To understand this standpoint the country took one has to go back to 1942 to where the “functional principle” came into existence. The functional principle has played an important role in framing the country’s foreign policy and one that could be adopted globally via multilateral forums to chart a morally acceptable world order. It was devised by Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong and was based on three criteria as stated by Hynek (2004: 37):
1) “The extent of Canada’s involvement in international affairs”.
2) “The pursuit of Canada’s interests”.
3) “Canada’s ability to contribute to the situation in question”.
This was a radical shift from the country’s previous position as an isolationist foreign policy according to Hynek (2004: 37) and this functionalist foreign policy that emerged after World War Two contributed to the country’s global position as a middle power. Furthermore, Canada’s image became refined to that of the world’s “helpful fixer” as argued by Hynek (2004: 37) and this engagement in world affairs extended to the country’s roles in multilateral institutions where it attempted to defuse crises, promote peace and stability, forge diplomatic relations with individual states and establish appropriate mediation efforts. One such institution where Canada was able to achieve this perspective and is the very institution that will be needed to guide the world into the post-covid era successfully was the United Nations (UN).
Canada’s foreign policy has close links to certain sections in the UN’s founding charter such as in Article 1 of the UN Charter (1945, 3) which states, “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” and is something we see in operation within Canada’s foreign policy to date.
To date the country has projected soft power to the same degree as Australia, which was discussed earlier in this article, and it is this soft power that Canada has projected that has enabled it to develop as a successful middle power well into the 21st century.
Canada’s strength as a middle power is what the world can take note of going forward into the post-covid era with a human security agenda being an appropriate framework in creating a safer world with the Canadian norms being of great necessity to the international system as it was partially in the creation of the UN over 75 years ago. Canada has discovered that its strength is in multilateralism, a standpoint supported by former Prime Minister Joe Clark as stated by the CBC Radio (2019) and such platforms will be beneficial in reinventing the multilateral order which will be an effective guide in the post-covid era to counter the growing unipolarity in geopolitics.
South Africa
The position South Africa holds on the African continent has enabled it to make it into this article as the country dominates the discourse in the African continent in several settings, particularly politically and economically. As a result of this influence over the African continent Habib (2009: 144) views the country for the time being as a “regional power” or “regional hegemon” which has positioned the country as a middle power. According to Habib (2009: 145) the term regional power can be defined as “a state which is part of a delineated region, is connected to it culturally, economically, and politically, influences its identity and affairs, defines its security, and aspires to provide it with leadership including through its governance structures, and acts as a representative and is recognised as such in regional and international quarters”.
However, this is not the only factor that has given South Africa middle power status. The country is a strong believer in multilateralism which has played a key role in building the new South Africa as envisioned by its first democratic President Nelson Mandela and leveraged multilateral organisations which played one of the most important roles in the fight against the apartheid regime and in building the new South Africa towards a democratic trajectory post-1994. This re-entry into the international arena in pursuit of a global audience witnessed the country solidifying its position in multilateral settings such as becoming a member of the (India, Brazil and South Africa) IBSA forum, BRICS, Group of 20 (G20) according to Alden and Schoeman (2013: 112) and secured a seat on the UN Security Council for a third time (Tryens-Fernandes 2018).
Alden and Schoeman (2013: 112-113) note an internationalist-orientation to the country’s Foreign Policy and the influence of political leaders, and point out the country’s regional power status being alluded to former President Thabo Mbeki which was ‘bolstered by his commitment to fostering an 'African renaissance' and the advance of regionally based multilateralism’. This included South Africa’s role in restructuring Africa’s institutional architecture, along-side other regional powers such as Nigeria according to Habib (2009: 148) which include the establishment of the Organisation of African Union’s (OAU’s) successor the African Union (AU) in 2002, the Pan-African parliament, and Mbeki’s much proclaimed New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The country also plays a leading role in the 16-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) where South Africa’s presence as a regional hegemon is even more greatly felt than the rest of Africa and is by far the dominant economy in the SADC. It is clear from this vantage point that South Africa is seen as ‘the gate way to Africa’ according to Lechini & Giaccaglia (2013: 394) but instead of being seen as ‘big brother’ which has sometimes invited the ire of other fellow African countries due to its economic dominance on the continent it instead wants to be seen as a ‘bridge builder’. This epitomises the country’s soft power approach in line with its progressive constitution.
Internationally South Africa has been punching above its weight through its involvement in multilateral organisations where the country has made its mark. The title of Alden & Schoeman’s article clearly envisages this: ‘South Africa in the company of giants’ (2013)' with the country being an equal partner to some of the world’s largest economies and superpowers. One such membership which has withstood the test of time being the BRICS. BRICS is a group of emerging markets according to Lechini & Giaccaglia (2013: 388), with South Africa joining the group in 2011 following considerable lobbying on its part. South Africa is seen as an emerging middle power by Schoeman (2003: 349) as it is not a ‘fully fledged’ middle power yet, hence the word “emerging” which is closely related to “developing”. Therefore, emerging middle powers are part of the developing world and include countries such as Brazil and India (who are also members of BRICS) which are regional powers in their regions and take less coercive approaches to strengthen their status such as being regional peacemakers, and this is precisely the role South Africa plays, both in the SADC and in the AU (Schoeman 2003: 351).
South Africa supports restructuring institutions towards fairer and more equal organisations, hence its clear involvement in multilateral organisations. The country is also a leading voice for reform within the UN Security Council for a permanent seat as mentioned by Imber (2006: 333) through the Ezulwini Consensus of the AU (2005) and is a debate that is ongoing to this day and the country is not alone in this endeavour and is joined by fellow middle powers Brazil, India, Germany and Japan who are known as the G4. To conclude this section, it is clear that multilateralism should continue to be championed in the post-COVID era as it is the very practice and process that will make the international system more representative of the global contact which South Africa wants to very much be involved in. This includes advocating for reforms in those international institutions that are not well represented as the country seeks to ‘make a few chairs’ for both Africa and the global south to have an equal role to the global north which continues to control the international system by ‘bridging the global north-south divide’.
Conclusion
The pandemic has created fractures within the international system sparing no country and with the vaccine programs now taking shape with some positive signs that hopefully will see COVID-19 more contained and controlled going forward, this has led to various questions within academia on what system will be best suited to tackle the effects of this pandemic. Considerate qualitative analysis was conducted to discover this phenomenon with middle power designated countries being discovered as one appropriate model to adopt going into the post-COVID era.
The article discussed in detail the concept of Middle Power and how it came into existence with the history of this concept being noticeably more theorised in International Relations following World War Two. Following a more nuanced introduction the article goes on to define each of the selected three countries chosen specifically for this article in line with the topic at hand, and how they can each contribute through their versions of middle power status a conducive, constructive, peaceful, and less coercive international system. The three countries selected represented different continents and regions so as to make sure there was equity in selection with Australia representing Oceania, Indo-Pacific region, Canada representing the America’s and South Africa representing Africa and the global south. While this article clearly shows the differences of each country in how they have configured their statuses in their respective regions, more specifically this article seeks to focus on their similarities.
Each country is significantly involved in multilateral organisations and this article clearly supports multilateralism as the best process to guide the world towards a more positive path going forward. These three countries also have an appetite to reform the international system to make it more exclusive, particularly the UN Security Council, which is dominated by just five global powers, known as the P5 which continues to be an area of contention in diplomatic circles that needs to be addressed. In finality this article sees middle powers political clout growing in the post-covid world as their type of politics, diplomacy and economic policies are clearly human-centred and based on uplifting people’s livelihoods and life expectations as their end-goal, although not clearly specified, is to create an international system that is stable, economically sound, and more representative of all the regions in the world.
“Middle powers are stabilisers and legitimisers of the world order” – Eduard Jordaan (2003, 167)
UPDATE: Although this article was published on June 17, 2024 its content originates from 2021 when it was first drafted.
References
Alden, Chris, and Maxi Schoeman. (2013). ‘South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming global order’, International Affairs, 89(1): 111–129.
AU. (2005). Decisions, Declarations and Resolution. African Union. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9552-assembly_en_4_5_july_2005_auc_fifth_ordinary_session_decisions_declarations_and_resolution.pdf
BBC. (2020). Coronavirus declared global health emergency by WHO. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51318246
CBC Radio. (2019). Canada as a middle power in an upended world: Time for a foreign policy reset? CBC Radio. https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.5372192
Davis, Malcolm. (2020). Australia as a rising middle power. S. Rajaratman School of International Studies (RSIS) Working Paper series No. 328. Singapore: RSIS.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government. (2017). Foreign Policy White Paper. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf
Global News. (2021). Canada ‘welcomes’ Israel-Hamas ceasefire, calls for commitment to peace. Global News. https://globalnews.ca/news/7884112/israel-palestine-ceasefire-canada-garneau/#:~:text=Canada%20welcomes%20a%20ceasefire%20ending,Affairs%20Minister%20Marc%20Garneau%20says.&text=Garneau%20said%20Canada%20is%20calling,toward%20a%20two%2Dstate%20solution
Government of Canada. (2018). Canada-Cuba Relations. Embassy of Canada to Cuba. https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/cuba/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.aspx?lang=
Habib, Adam. (2009). ‘South Africa's foreign policy: hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation’. South African Journal of International Affairs, 16(2): 143-159.
Holbraad, Carsten. (1984). Middle Powers in International Politics. London: Macmillan Press.
Hynek, Nikola. (2004). ‘Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and Promises’. The Central European Journal of Canadian Studies, 4(1): 33-43.
Imber, Mark. (2006). ‘The Reform of the UN Security Council’. International Relations, 20(3): 328-334.
Jordaan, Eduard. (2003). ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers’. Politikon, 30(1): 165-181.
Karp, Paul. (2021). Australia’s living standards have risen and economy is ‘roaring back’, Deloitte says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/apr/12/australias-living-standards-have-risen-and-economy-is-roaring-back-deloitte-says#:~:text=1%20month%20old-,Australia's%20living%20standards%20have%20risen%20and,'roaring%20back'%2C%20Deloitte%20says&text=Australia's%20living%20standards%20actually%20increased,and%20rock%20bottom%20interest%20rates
Lechini, Gladys. and Giaccaglia, Clarisa. (2013). ‘IBSA or BRICS: What is preferable for South Africa and Africa-both or none?’ In Murithi, T. (ed), Routledge International Handbook: Handbook of Africa’s International Relations. Florence, GB: Routledge.
Nonnenmacher, Georga. (2020). The Rise of a Middle Power? Australian Outlook. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-rise-of-a-middle-power/
Nye, Joseph. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.
Paris, Roland. (2019). Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order? The Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper. London: Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Schoeman, Maxi. (2003). ‘South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994-2003’. In Daniel, J., Habib, A. & Southall, R. (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa, 2003-2004. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council.
Schweller, Randall. L. (2017). ‘The Concept of Middle Power. In Cha, V. D. & Dumonds, M. (eds), The Korean Pivot: The Study of South Korea as a Global Power. Washington DC: Center For Strategic & International Studies.
Thomson, Mark. (2005). Punching above our weight?: Australia as a middle power. Barton, A.C.T. : Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Tryens-Fernandes, Savannah. (2018). South Africa Secures Seat on UN Security Council for Third Time. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/south-africa-secures-seat-un-security-council-third-time
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf
World Health Organisation. (2021). Australia: COVID-19. WHO. https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/au
Yendamuri, Praneeth. & Ingilizian, Zara. (2019). In 2020 Asia will have the world’s largest GDP. Here’s what that means. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/asia-economic-growth/
Zakaria, Fareed. (2020). Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
